ID Cards and the Database State

Big Brother could soon be watching you – Shirley Gibb tackles the UK government’s plans for ID cards head on.

The National Identity Register.

'The Price of Freedom is Eternal Vigilance.' Thomas Jefferson.

The Identity Cards Act became law in 2006.

The last time we had ID cards in Britain was during the Second World War. A man called Clarence Willcock eventually decided he disliked them enough to refuse to show his when asked, and that was the beginning of the end. Winston Churchill abolished them in 1952.

Those wartime cards were just bits of cardboard with people's names and date of birth on them, but even they seemed an unwarranted invasion of people's rights and privacy. Why should law abiding citizens have to prove who they are, or explain themselves in any way, when going about their daily business?

The ID cards about to be introduced today are a million miles away from those bits of brown cardboard. And the biggest difference is that we will have not just our names on them, but also a number. And that number will link us to a database called The National Identity Register. (NIR)

Even before I knew much about the NIR I found the idea of being numbered abhorrent.

Numbering brings to mind cattle branding, Nazi Germany and science fiction. I was a fan of the TV series 'The Prisoner', which has the hero saying “I am not a number, I am a free man.”

It is often pointed out that other European countries have ID Cards. This is true, but they are not linked to the kind of database we will have.

Germany, a country that has been through the horror that can be enabled by numbering people, now has constitutional limitations on the establishment of the kind of NIR we are planning.

Our database will be the biggest store of personal information in the world. This link gives you a Wikipedia list of the information it will hold:

It will give the state an unprecedented level of surveillance and control over its population.

We will be on the NIR for life, and will be bound by law to keep it updated. If we fail to inform the NIR of significant changes to our personal lives, we could face a fine of up to £1000.

If we fail to inform the police promptly of the loss of our card we will have committed a criminal offence, and face a fine and/or 51 weeks imprisonment.

Our every use of the ID card and passports will be noted on the database – so the state will have a clear picture of our daily life. Travel, visits to doctors, hospitals, Social Security offices, lawyers, banks and building societies – the swiping of our ID cards will ensure that none of these will remain confidential.

And it won't be just a few carefully vetted people who can see our information. The NIR will be able to be viewed by all government agencies. This will include the police, tax officials, and housing benefit staff.

At the final reading of the ID Cards Bill, Charles Clarke put forward this amendment:

“It will not be possible to add a Police National Computer Number to the National Identity Register.”

But a National Identity Register Number can be added to the Police National Computer, so the two databases will be able to be linked.

'Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.' Benjamin Franklin

The nothing to hide, nothing to fear mantra is an often used argument for ID cards and the NIR. It sounds good, and in some situations might be true, but not in this one.

It assumes that the NIR will be infallible. In fact it is accepted by people who have knowledge of the workings of computers and databases that errors will almost certainly occur.

We have already had a spate of losses of huge numbers of CDs containing people's personal information.

Added to this ever present danger of loss of information is the fact that if a database gets beyond a certain size it can throw up what are called false positives and false negatives.

False positives are when a person is wrongly identified from biometric information, and false negatives are when a person who should be identified, isn't.

If our DNA information is permanently available, we are likely to be involved in police investigations just because our DNA is left at a venue we were at where a crime was subsequently committed.

Similar names and addresses can be confused – this has happened even with existing methods of storing data, and people have become involved in fights to prove who they really are.

We will have no privacy. And if people think that every detail of their lives being on a database isn't something to worry about, they should consider how they'd feel if their house could be searched routinely, or there were cameras in it. Far fetched? So was the idea of a Database State, a few short years ago.

'An economist is an expert who will know tomorrow why the things he predicted yesterday didn't happen today. ' Laurence J. Peter

The minimum cost of the scheme is currently thought to be £5.8 billion. This estimate has doubled since 2004.

An “enhanced” biometric passport, which includes entry on the national register, will cost around £93. An ID card without a passport will on current estimates cost about £30.

'In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.' George Orwell.

A good question, which the Westminster government itself seems unable to answer.

On February 19^th this year The Green Party leaked a Government ID Card Review, which reveals that Ministers were still debating what the scheme should officially be for. The four options were:

1. Borders, security and police.

2. Personal safety of me and my family.

3. Access to public services.

4. Proving who I am.

Possible responses are:

1. ID cards don't stop illegal immigration in Europe, and there is no evidence that terrorist attacks would be prevented by their introduction. In fact, the 9/11 terrorists had valid documents, and Spanish ID cards didn’t prevent the Madrid bombing.

3. It is not necessary to have ID Cards to access public services. Benefit Fraud seldom happens because people are pretending to be someone else. It usually happens when people claim extra or legally unentitled benefits in their own name.

Perhaps we should be asking “What is the scheme really, rather than officially, for?”

'Power never takes a back step - only in the face of more power.' Malcolm X

In Scotland the SNP, Conservatives, Greens and Independents are all against ID Cards. So are the Lib Dems now, though they seem to have had a late conversion – in 2005 they abstained during a Holyrood debate on the subject.

Luckily for us the present Scottish Government is very much against the scheme and has talked about using devolved powers to prevent the use of ID cards being successful. They could for example state that we don't need ID cards to access devolved services, which include health, education and justice.

But the most powerful tool we have against the introduction of ID Cards and the Database State is people standing against them and refusing to take part in the scheme – just as we did in refusing to accept Thatcher’s hated poll tax a generation ago.

If we don't stop this, we might not be in a position to stop anything in future. This will completely change the relationship between the people and the state. It will give unprecedented power to future governments.